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This report describes the results of a financial modelling exercise carried out by the Palmer 
Development Group at the request of the Energy and Development Research Centre, 
University of Cape Town. Although produced as a stand-alone report, this document forms 
part of a larger EDRC research programme addressing the role of electricity in integrated rural 
energy provision. 
Underlying much of the analysis in this report is an Excel-based financial model, which was 
developed primarily by Bee Thompson of PDG, with some assistance from Clive van Horen. 
The running of the model and writing of the report were done mainly by the latter, with help 
from the former. Overall responsibility for the report rests with both. 
The assistance of a number of EDRC staff in providing information and data is gratefully 
acknowledged. Thanks are also due to Dr. Mark Davis of EDRC for his comments on an earlier 
draft of the report. Although it was initially hoped that much of the data would be available 
from the National Electricity Regulator, it proved impossible to secure this data in the project's 
time frame; nevertheless, thanks are due to the NER staff who did offer their time and 
published data. 
The restructuring of South Africa's electricity industry is a complex and controversial issue at 
present; the intention in this study is to make a constructive contribution to the transformation 
process by providing as rigorous an analysis as allowed by time and resource constraints. We 
hope this report will make a contribution in this way. 
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Executive summary 
Introduction 
South Africa's national electrification programme has been underway since 1991, and well 
over two million new connections have been made in the intervening period. Questions are, 
however, increasingly arising regarding the future of the electrification programme beyond 
1999, as urban areas become fully electrified, the capital and operating costs of electrifying 
rural areas rise, and revenues remain low. Mixed service levels and the question of the 
subsidisation of electrification are therefore receiving further attention. 
This study was undertaken by Palmer Development Group at the request of the Energy and 
Development Research Centre (EDRC), University of Cape Town, with the aim of analysing 
the financial impacts of the electrification programme and especially the subsidy implications of 
various scenarios. The analysis was based on the provisional boundaries of regional electricity 
distributors (REDs) as proposed in the government's most recent document (ERIC 1996). 
Methodology 
The approach taken in this project involved three steps. Firstly, a spreadsheet-based financial 
model was developed, using Microsoft Excel software. This model, termed the Electrification 
Financing Model (or EFM), has been designed to include all the main input variables which 
influence the financial viability of electrification projects, and to report a number of output 
variables which collectively provide an indication of the performance of an electricity 
distributor. The second step was the running of the EFM using data from the five provisional 
regional distributors. Important output variables were analysed by adjusting input assumptions, 
particularly around the financing of the electrification programme, target service levels and the 
allocation of subsidies. Finally, these results have been written up in this report. 
Financing options for electrification 
A central feature of this project was the attention given to various sources of finance for the 
electrification programme. Potential sources include: 
• operating revenues from electrification customers themselves (self-financing); 
• additional operating revenues extracted from other electricity consumers by charging 
higher prices (cross-subsidies); 
• borrowings obtained from the capital markets; and 
• capital subsidies secured from government and other sources. 
It is, however, unlikely that the government will be willing to provide (much) grant finance in 
the foreseeable future, and so the issue arises over how the electrification programme can be 
financed beyond 1999. 
In practice, the level of borrowings is normally limited by an organisation's target debt/equity 
and interest cover ratios, as these influence its ability to raise debt as well as the cost of that 
debt. These ratios were therefore used in the study as indicators of the financial health of the 
REDs and to identify when capital grants may be required. 
The data 
A large number of inputs are required in order to accurately model the financial position of a 
restructured electricity distribution industry. At the commencement of this project, it was 
expected that the most important variables - such as population, levels of service, capital and 
operating costs, losses and average tariffs - could be accessed for each of the five REDs from 
the National Electricity Regulator (NER) database. This was not possible, however, and the 
NER was unable to release information other than that which is published in its statistical report 
(NER 1996a). Consequently, a margin of error exists in some data used for the REDs, since 
data have been collected from a range of o¢er sources, although the margin of error is unlikely 
to be so great as to affect the overall conclusions of this study. 
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The scenarios 
Three scenarios were analysed as follows: 
• The base scenario, which involves providing mixed levels of service for lower income 
households, including a fairly large proportion of 2.5 Amp and solar connections in rural 
areas. Results are presented for combined grid and non-grid supply, and for non-grid only. 
• A scenario aiming for 'equity in outcome', in which all lower income households receive 20 
Amp connections. 
• A scenario applying 'equity in finance', in which all (lower-income) consumers benefit from 
the same amount of external grant finance. 
Further analysis of solar electrification with grid-equivalent subsidies was also conducted. 
Results and conclusions 
In modelling the financial performance of the REDs, a number of important financial 
parameters· have been selected: 
• Tariffs in each RED are based on Eskom's 1997 tariffs and this means that the large number 
of existing tariffs will converge to these levels. In the absence of data on this, it is difficult to 
assess whether there will be a net increase or decrease in tariffs for those consumers 
currently supplied by municipalities, although it is possible that tariffs would rise for 
residential consumers and decline for non-residential consumers. 
• Likewise, operating costs are assumed to converge towards those used by Eskom in its 
financial planning, thus implying an increase in operating efficiency on the part of municipal 
distributors. 
• The new REDs are expected to commence operations with relatively strong balance sheets, 
with debt/equity ratios of 1:1. This is a fairly favourable opening position which is 
considered necessary in order for REDs to be able to raise the necessary loan finance at 
competitive rates. The implication is that Eskom's generation and transmission divisions 
may have to accept somewhat higher debt loadings. 
• The REDs are expected to make transfer payments to municipal service authorities in their 
jurisdiction, equivalent to the rate of surpluses currently earned from the trade of electricity. 
According to the ERIC report (1996), these amounted to R1.5 billion per annum and so the 
surplus retained within the REDs will be reduced by the equivalent percentage. 
• Fairly conservative financial constraints have been imposed on REDs in terms of price 
increases and debt levels. For instance, a maximum real price increase of 5% has been 
selected and a maximum debt/equity ratio of 1.5, on the basis that any higher price 
increases or gearing levels could lead to financial problems of their own. 
• The analysis has not accounted for the possible introduction of income taxation or dividend 
payments in the electricity industry. In both cases, the effective price of electricity will 
increase (all other things equal), probably resulting in some loss of revenues as consumption 
decreases. 
The first conclusion emerging from the study is that two of the five REDs - Northern and 
Central - will be unviable if they maintain prices at their starting position. Both produce net 
losses for the entire 20-year period of analysis and are clearly not sustainable without some 
intervention. When their prices are increased by 5% in real terms, their position improves 
considerably. In the case of Central RED, a further external subsidy transfer of R595 million 
over seven years to 2006 is required to keep its financial position within the prescribed 
parameters (1997 Rands) . 
This financial situation raises difficult policy questions, as it indicates that the most recent 
proposal of five REDs is sustainable with a narrow margin of safety and with numerous 
provisos which have to satisfied. Several policy options exist to secure this position: 
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• Firstly, government could provide the capital grants required to sustain the viability of 
Central RED. The analysis suggests that these would be required during the first ten years 
after 1997, after which all REDs would be viability on their own. To-date, however, 
government has not provided any grant finance specifically for electrification (other than 
through its municipal grant programmes) and it is unlikely to begin doing so, particularly 
while other REDs are making healthy surpluses. This position could change, though, with 
the introduction of corporate income tax and divided payments in the electricity industry in 
the near future. 
• Secondly, a mechanism could be established through which transfers are made from 
healthy to unviable REDs, based on as yet unspecified criteria. However, this could 
seriously distort the financial incentives faced by both categories of distributor, effectively 
discouraging the wealthier REDs from making surpluses, whilst reducing the incentive for 
the poorer REDs to cut their losses. 
• Thirdly, a levy could be introduced on sales to all electricity consumers; the proceeds would 
then be· paid into a central fund and redistributed to REDs according to a set of criteria 
which will ensure their financial viability. This option has been considered for several years, 
but is not favoured by the Department of Finance as it remains outside of central fiscal 
control. Needless to say, this option, like the previous two options, carries an opportunity 
cost insofar as both the higher electricity tariffs paid by consumers and the use of limited 
government grant finance, preclude the use of those resources for other, potentially more 
productive purposes. 
• Finally, the boundaries of the REDs could be re-drawn in such a way that each remaining 
distributor is financially viable on its own. Although this will require more initial desk-based 
analysis to model the financial viability of the REDs before they can be set up, it is likely that 
the long-term cost effectiveness of such a system will be considerably greater than in the 
case of the above three options. The regulatory and governance responsibilities attached to 
any option where financial transfers are made on an annual basis, in terms of complex and 
potentially politically-loaded criteria, will be very significant and costly. 
This issue of RED boundaries, and the financial parameters within which they operate, is one 
of the most important policy questions to be settled in the restructuring process. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this project to propose revised RED boundaries, it is possible that, say, 
three or four REDs could be more viable: by combining Northern and Wits, and incorporating 
some or all of Central RED (particularly the former Transkei area) in more profitable 
neighbouring REDs such as Eastern or Western. This issue is one which merits further analysis. 
The analysis of off-grid electrification suggests that, as a stand-alone operation, it is not 
financially viable at the tariff levels used in this study, which were set at a similar level to 2.5A 
supplies. It is clear that on a purely financial level, subsidies will be required to sustain an off-
grid electrification programme. Although large in relation to the off-grid programme itself, these 
subsidy requirements are very modest in relation to the grid programme. This is not to say off-
grid electrification is financially unattractive- on the contrary, in many rural areas, it will result 
in smaller losses being incurred by the REDs and therefore carries a lower opportunity cost 
than grid electrification. 
Also important, are the conclusions emerging from the analysis of an alternative electrification 
scenario in which 'equity in outcome' is taken as the objective. Providing 20A supplies to all 
unelectrified households has a large negative effect on RED performance, especially the two 
weaker distributors - Northern and Central. Their total subsidy requirement in this scenario 
increased by a cumulative R9.1 billion over the life of the programme - funds which could 
almost certainly be put to better use elsewhere in the economy, given the social and economic 
benefits which could accrue from the productive use of those funds. Thus the current direction 
being taken by the industry, namely that of providing consumers with choices of various 
service levels, with costs and tariffs better qtatched to their affordability profiles, makes sound 
financial sense. 
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Sustainable financing of electrification in South Africa 
1 . Introduction 
South Africa's national electrification programme has been underway since 1991, with over 
two million new connections having been made by the end of 1996, at a total capital cost of 
some R6 billion (NER 1996). The result of this enormous effort is that the level of household 
access to electricity rose from around 33% in 1991 to 55% by the end of 1996. Based on this 
track record, the government's target, of 2.5 million connections between 1994 and 1999, 
bringing total households access to around 70%, seems achievable. 
Increasingly, however, questions are arising regarding the future of the electrification 
programme beyond 1999, particularly as urban areas become fully electrified, causing 
electricity distributors to move their attention to Jess densely settled rural areas. Both the capital 
cost of electrifying these areas and the operating costs of serving them are higher, whilst 
revenues are lower. This unfavourable financial situation has been the catalyst for several 
innovations, such as mixed levels of grid electricity supplies, the introduction of off-grid solar 
electricity options, and tariff structures linked to limited supply capacities. At the same time, the 
question of subsidisation of electrification is receiving further attention, particularly if 
government's goal beyond 1999 will be to continue to extend supplies to rural communities. 
Consequently, this study has been undertaken by Palmer Development Group at the request of 
the Energy and Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town, with the aim of 
analysing the financial impacts of the electrification programme and especially the subsidy 
implications of various scenarios. This study forms part of a larger EDRC project investigating 
the role of electricity in the integrated provision of energy in South Africa's rural areas. 
2. Objectives of this study 
As stated in the terms of reference for the study, the overall objective is to investigate the 
financial implications of scenarios around the subsidisation of rural electrification in the context 
of the overall programme, including various grid and non-grid technology options. The project 
involves three main components: firstly, the development of a financial modelling tool for use 
in analysing the electrification programme and the distribution industry as a whole; secondly, 
financial analysis of electrification scenarios and especially their subsidy implications; and, 
thirdly, the preparation of a report describing the results of the analysis. This document 
describes the results of the analysis in some detail, and provides an overview of the modelling 
tool. 
Several prior financial modelling exercises have been undertaken in recent years (NEES 1993; 
Van Horen 1994; Els 1994; Davis 1996; ERIC 1996) and the intention is not to repeat or re-
analyse these studies. Although there are areas of overlap, this study differs from previous ones 
in two main respects: 
• its focus is explicitly on the subsidy implications of electrification scenarios; 
• secondly, its analysis is based on a provisional set of boundaries of five regional 
electricity distributors (REDs}, whereas (with the exception of the ERIC report) the 
above-mentioned studies did not address questions of RED boundaries. 
To this extent, the work builds upon and extends previous studies. It has also been undertaken 
at about the same time as the National Electricity Regulator (NER) is commencing a large 
modelling exercise in support of the restructuring process in the electricity supply industry. It 
must be stressed that the choice of five REDs (as opposed to any other number) is not intended 
to imply any necessary preference for this number of REDs, nor is it intended to pre-empt the 
policy debate and transformation process. Instead, the five REDs used here have been selected 
simply because this was the last 'officially tabled' proposal emanating from the work of the 
government's Electricity Restructuring Inter-department Committee (ERIC). Since then, a 
number of other proposals have been put forward, although none have been accepted by 
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government. It is hoped that this analysis will represent a useful further input into the 
transformation process. 
Two further items underline the relevance of this study. Firstly, there is a contradictory view 
regarding the financial viability of a small number of (about five) REDs. The Electricity Working 
Group (EWG) report, although not containing results of any financial analysis, stated that 
'initial financial modelling indicates that it is not possible to establish a small number of REDs 
(e.g. 5- 15) because they will not be financially viable' (EWG 1995: 15). One of the main aims 
of the ERIC study, on the other hand, was to test the financial viability of the proposed five 
REDs - and found that these were indeed potentially viable (1996: 20). Clearly, there is no 
unanimity on this issue and it merits further investigation. 
Secondly, an assumption throughout the NELF, EWG and ERIC work was that the 
electrification programme can and should be financed from within the industry, as opposed to 
seeking finance from the fiscus. At the same time, the existing surpluses produced by municipal 
distributors are intended to remain dedicated to municipal services. Further, most previous 
analyses have taken a five- or ten-year time horizon, even though the impacts of electrification 
endure far longer than this. In this context, it is important to investigate what financing options 
are feasible in the longer term and whether, in fact, external finance from government will be 
required to sustain the electrification programme. 
3. Methodology and approach 
3. 1 Financial modelling and analysis 
The approach taken in this project involves several steps. Firstly, a spreadsheet-based financial 
model has been developed, using Microsoft Excel software. This model, termed the 
Electrification Financing Model (EFM}, has been designed to include all the main input 
variables which influence the financial viability of electrification projects, and to report on a 
number of output variables which collectively provide an indication of the performance of an 
electricity distributor. Although large, the- model is relatively user-friendly and does not require 
a high level of spreadsheet expertise to be used successfully. 
An important feature of the EFM is that it includes default data for the main costing, 
consumption and financial variables. These defaults are based on a collection of published and 
unpublished sources, representing the best available information at the time. Provision is made 
in the model to enter alternative values for any of these variables, and this has been done in 
several cases in the present study. Input variables used in the study include all the main items 
related to costs, revenues, demographics, connection targets, borrowing costs and so on. These 
variables are too numerous to describe in the body of this report - instead, they are presented, 
together with the default values, in Appendix 1 at the end of the report. Likewise, the model 
outputs are shown in Appendix 2. 
Another key feature of the EFM is that it integrates the electrification programme (essentially 
one element of a distributor's capital investment programme) into the overall operations of a 
distributor. Consequently, the entire financial position of a RED can be modelled, rather than 
treating the electrification programme on a stand-alone basis. 
The second main step in the project has been the running of the EFM using data from the five 
provisional regional distributors. Important output variables have been analysed by adjusting 
input assumptions, particularly around the financing of the electrification programme and 
target service levels. Similar analyses have also been undertaken using alternative assumptions, 
especially around the subsidy framework. 
Finally, these results have been written up in this report; a higher level of detail regarding 
inputs and outputs is contained in the Appendices. 
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3.2 The conceptual framework for electrification financing 
A central feature of this project has been the attention given to various sources of finance for 
the electrification programme. Early financial analyses simply quantified the financing 
requirement- in other words, they have 'casted' the programme by estimating the amount of 
money which must be raised if the electricity industry is to meet its connection targets (NEES 
1993; Van Horen 1994). In some cases, the analyses have gone further by investigating the 
effective cross-subsidy which is required to meet this financing requirement, or variants of this 
approach (Els 1994; Davis 1996). None of the previous studies, however, have attempted to 
link these financing options with debt financing, and particularly the parameters within which 
distributors would have to operate to maintain their borrowing capacity and risks at acceptable 
levels. This is a key feature of the present study, in that it attempts to integrate the main 
financing options available to distributors. 
These financing sources are as follows, in the order in which they will be used: 
• oper9-ting revenues from electrification customers themselves, combined with borrowings 
to cover some or all of the initial capital investment; 
• additional operating revenues extracted from other electricity consumers by charging 
higher prices; in other words, a cross-subsidy is drawn from the consumer base at large, 
either in a hidden manner or explicitly through a levy of sorts; 
• borrowings will be taken on from the capital markets, either in the form of bonds or bulk 
loans from banks and other financial institutions; and finally, 
• capital subsidies will be secured from government and other sources. 
Of course, most organisations would seek to use capital subsidies first, if they had the choice, 
but, given the status quo in South Africa's electricity industry, it is unlikely that government will 
provide grant finance in the foreseeable future, and so this is likely to be the last source of 
finance to become available. Indeed, the central question in this study could be phrased as: 'if 
the industry is to continue to electrify at the given rate, and if cross-subsidies are to be utilised 
(up to a point) , and if borrowings are to be maintained at healthy levels, then will there be a 
financial shortfall to be met from external financing sources and, if so, how much will this 
shortfall be?' 
An important feature of the EFM is that it allows for parameters to be set on the extent to which 
each of the above financing sources will be tapped. Clearly, there is a limit to the amount of 
cross-subsidy which can be extracted from the consumer base without causing severe 
disruptions, both economically, because rising prices will encourage the substitution effect, and 
politically because of resistance to very large price increases. Consequently, the model allows 
for a maximum real price increase to be set (say 5%). 
Beyond this, distributors would tum to capital markets for borrowings to finance capital 
expenditure. At the very least, operating revenues should cover operating costs in full, and 
ideally, contribute also to capital expenditure. If, however, revenues are insufficient to cover 
operating costs, and the utilities borrow funds, they could enter a debt trap scenario (assuming 
that lenders would be willing to lend them anything). Consequently, as with cross-subsidies, 
there will be a limit to the amount of debt which can be taken on before the utility's balance 
sheet becomes too weak and its finance charges too large to bear. 
Two important indicators of the level of gearing (borrowing) are the distributor's debt/equity 
ratio and its interest cover. 1 In practice, the level of borrowing will normally be limited by an 
organisation's target debt/equity and interest cover ratios, which in tum, influence both its 
ability to raise debt and the cost of that debt. Consequently, the EFM calculates these values 
and displays them in such a manner that the user is guided as to the maximum amount of 
borrowing the distributor can incur. 
The debt/equity ratio is the ratio of long-term liabilities to accumulated resetves (equity), whilst the interest 
cover is the ratio of net operating income (before finance charges) to finance charges. 
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Having exhausted all the above financing options - operating revenues, cross-subsidies and 
capital borrowing - distributors may still be faced with a shortfall. This represents the subsidy 
they require to remain financially viable. If this is not provided by government, the distributor 
will either run into serious financial problems leading to its insolvency, or it will have to cut 
back on its electrification investment levels, or both. 
The financial flows described above are depicted graphically in figure 1 below, using 
illustrative cross-subsidy levels and debt/equity ratios of 5% and 1.5 respectively. 
Electrification revenues: Yes 
Electrification ,. sufficient to finance all 
programme costs (capital + operating)? 
I' 
~No 
Cross-subsidy (levy), Yes 
max of 5%: sufficient to 
finance all costs? 
~No Financial 
sustainability for 
I Borrowings, max debt I Yes distributor equity of 1.5: sufficient to 
I I finance all costs? 
l No 
I External subsidy: Yes 
sufficient to finance all 
costs? 
l No 
I Financially unviable I distributor 
Figure 1: Financing flows of electricity distributors 
It is evident from this figure that there is a progression of financing options which will be 
utilised, usually starting with the lowest cost of capital before moving to higher cost options. 
The exception to this is grant finance which- although it has the lowest cost to the utility, if not 
necessarily to the economy as a whole - is likely to be made available by the fiscus only as a 
last resort. 
Another important aspect of the financing approach used for the present study relates to the 
match between cash inflows and outflo~s. As noted above, it is essential that distributors have 
sound financial foundations if they are to be sustainable in financial terms. This has 
implications for the mix of financing options, which is shown graphically in figure 2. The 
absolute sizes of the bars are not important, but they illustrate the relative balance between 
components of cash inflows and outflows, both capital and operating. If revenues from 
electrification customers, plus revenues from other customers do not at least equal the sum of 
(bulk purchase costs + O&M costs + finance charges), then the distributor is likely to move 
into a debt trap situation. Instead, it should at least be able to finance a portion of its capital 
expenditure from operating revenues (plus connection fees). By the same logic, if it does not 
receive a subsidy, it will be unable to fully cover its funding requirements, and would run into 
insolvency problems.The subsequent analysis of RED viability will be undertaken within this 
conceptual framework. In all cases, real 1997 Rands are used in the analysis and results. 
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Figure 2: Balance between cash inflows and outflows 
4. Key assumptions and inputs into the financial 
analysis 
A large number of inputs are required in order to accurately model the financial position of a 
restructured electricity distribution industry. In some cases, reasonably good data exist and are 
published, but for many important variables, there is a high level of uncertainty. Appendix 1 
contains printed versions of the input sheets from the EFM model, containing all the input 
variables for one of the REDs (Northern/RED A). In this section, the most important inputs and 
assumptions are described. 
4.1 RED boundaries 
In the absence of any firm indication of the number of REDs to be deployed in future, this 
study has used the five REDs as proposed in the ERIC report. These approximate the 
boundaries of Eskom's five internal distributors and are named as follows (refer to Figure 3, 
which is taken from ERIC (1996)): 
• Northern (RED A): comprising most of Northern, Mpumalanga and North West 
Provinces, and the northern portion of Gauteng; 
• Western (RED B): comprising all of the Western Cape and a portion of the Northern 
Cape; 
• Central (RED C): comprising all of the Eastern Cape, most of the Northern Cape and 
Free State, and 'a portion of North West Province; 
• Eastern (RED D): comprising all of KwaZulu-Natal and the eastern portion of the Free 
State; 
• Wits (RED E): comprising the remainder of Gauteng province. 
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As noted earlier, the use of these RED boundaries does not imply any endorsement or 
otherwise of them. 
At the commencement of this project, it was expected that the most important variables - such 
as population, levels of service, capital and operating costs, losses and average tariffs - could 
be accessed for each of the five REDs from the NER database which includes all these data 
(and more) as supplied by individual licence holders. This was not possible, however, and the 
NER was unable to release information other than that which is published in its statistical report 
(1996a). Consequently, a margin of error exists in some data, since data have had to be 
obtained from a range of other sources, although the margin of error is unlikely to so great as 
to affect the overall conclusions of this study. 
4.2 Demographics 
The total number of households used in this study is 8.6 million, with 1996 as the base year. 
For modelling purposes these have been split into three categories: urban, rural 1 (dense) and 
rural 2 (dispersed), where the latter group is that portion of the rural population which lives in 
dispersed settlements of less than a thousand or so and which are presently located far from 
the electricity grid. The number of households as used in each RED is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Distribution of households in each RED 
RED Urban Rural 1 (dense) Rural 2 (dispersed) Total 
Northern (A) 975 551 1 350 762 578 898 2 905 211 
Western (B) 736 349 100 943 25 236 862 527 
Central (C) 847 524 414 870 414 870 1 677 264 
Eastern (D) 848 629 510 823 510 823 1 870 276 
Wits (E) 1 225 875 55 816 6 202 1 287 893 
Total SA 4 633 928 2 433 215 1 536 029 8 603 172 
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In the absence of better data, assumptions have had to be made about the split between Dense 
and Dispersed rural populations. Population data were derived from the NER database as 
reported in their statistical report (NER 1996a), with some adjustments being made.2 
4.3 Service levels of existing households 
Whilst there is reasonable certainty about the number of electrified households, the quality of 
information about the number of unelectrified households in South Africa is extremely poor. 
Overall, the NER reported that 55% of all households had electricity by the end of 1996, with 
urban access of 79% and rural access of 27% (NER 1996b: 17). 
For purpose of this exercise, provision has been made for up to nine service levels: no service 
at all, Solar 1 (a photovoltaic system with a single 50 W solar panel and 100 Amp-hour 
battery) , Solar 2 (a higher level solar system with two panels, total 100 Wand 150-200 Amp-
hour battery) , 2.5A grid supply, 8A grid, 20A grid and 60A grid, with a distinction in the latter 
case between low-, middle- and high-income households (since these income groups consume 
different amounts of electricity) . 
Information about the existing service levels in each RED was not available for this study, so 
published provincial information was used, together with certain assumptions. In particular, 
these included the portion of new connections made since 1991 which were 20A and 60A. It 
was assumed that as at the beginning of 1997, there were to all intents and purposes, no 2.5A 
or 8A supplies in South Africa. The resulting service levels as at the beginning of 1997 are 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Service levels in each RED at the beginning of 1997 
RED Urban Rural 1 (dense) Rural 2 (dispersed) Total 
None 20A 60A 60A total None 20A 60A low 60A total None 20A 60A 60A electrif 
low inc inc low inc total 
Northern (A) 24% 30% 13% 33% 72% 15% 1% 12% 73% 23% 0% 3% 42% 
Western (B) 11 % 8% 2% 79% 49% 7% 2% 41 % 50% 30% 0% 20% 83% 
Central (C) 24% 18% 8% 50% 65% 24% 2% 9% 66% 16% 0% 18% 54% 
Eastern (D) 17% 15% 7% 61 % 81% 16% 1% 2% 82% 11 % 0% 7% 47% 
Wits(E) 20% 10% 2% 67% 46% 23% 6% 25% 49% 0% 0% 51 % 78% 
Total SA 20% 17% 7% 57% 71% 16% 2% 11% 74% 17% 0% 9% 55% 
4.4 Electricity consumption levels 
Electricity consumption data as published in the NER statistical report were used for the · base 
year, 1996, for residential, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, commercial, transport and 
general consumer categories. These consumption data, as reorganised into the REDs, are 
shown in Table 3 and Table 4. 
2 There is a discrepancy of 564 000 households between two figures reported by the NER as the number of 
electricity consumers (NER 1996: 17ff) . Adjustments have therefore had to be made to the published data 
to account for this discrepancy. 
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Table 3: Electricity consumption in each RED, 1996 
RED Domestic Agriculture Mining Manufact Commerc Transport General Total 
MWh MWh MWh MWh MWh MWh MWh MWh 
Northern (A) 4 078 740 906 209 5 852 776 28715493 4 303 000 682 568 79 948 44 618 734 
Western (B) 4 355 494 688 817 66 210 5 879 816 1 420 920 303 860 279 070 12 994187 
Central (C) 3 752 856 1 250 983 19 476 972 5 056 338 1 124 344 791 442 35 776 31488 711 
Eastern (D) 10 118 721 655 485 295 739 17 314 608 486 530 1 234 640 823 204 30 928 927 
Wits (E) 9 514 301 249 742 6 166 008 16 939 289 5 812 467 791 627 143 838 39 617 272 
Total SA 31 820 112 3 751 236 31 857 705 73 905 544 13 147 261 3 804 137 1 361 836 159 647 831 
It is apparent from Table 4 that the average consumption within some groups varies widely. 
For example, the average consumption per household varies from a low of 3 759 kWh per 
annum in RED C to 11 518 kWh in RED D. There is no obvious explanation for this, aside 
from general economic welfare, but this variable has important impacts on the revenue base 
and therefqre financial viability of electricity distributors. 
Future electricity consumption by non-residential consumers is assumed to grow by around 3% 
per annum, in line with historical trends, with lower rates for mining and agriculture, and 
higher rates for commercial and industrial sectors. Although it might be argued that higher 
growth rates will occur if the economy achieves the government's target of 6% by the year 
2000, unfortunately this scenario appears somewhat unlikely to materialise. Furthermore, it is 
likely that the economy's future growth path will be less electricity-intensive, especially with the 
relative decline of gold mining. Consequently, a modest growth rate has been used for non-
residential consumers. 
For residential consumers, electricity consumption is assumed to be much lower than originally 
expected at the commencement of the electrification programme in 1991, but with reasonably 
high annual growth rates for new consumers (albeit off a low base), in line with the experience 
of the last five years (see NER (1996b: 24) for more details and see Appendix 1, sheet 2.5 for 
assumptions at each service level). 
Table 4: Average consumption per consumer, by RED, 1996 
RED Domestic Agriculture Mining Manufact Commerce Transport General Total 
kWhpa kWhpa kWhpa kWhpa kWhpa kWhpa kWhpa kWhpa 
Northern (A) 4 609 37 374 16 674 575 6 239 786 137 582 4 266 050 255 425 47170 
Western (B) 6 212 47166 1 614 878 1 143 266 36 850 4 823175 82 859 17 032 
Central (C) 3 759 34094 89 343 908 774 799 27 581 3 382 231 92 206 29 068 
Eastern (D) 11 518 110 370 4224 843 6 685 177 27 708 13 134 468 120 457 33 929 
Wits(E) 9 696 40036 67 021 826 1 772 078 160 176 3 549 897 389 805 38 314 
Total SA 7 160 42 764 41 266 457 2 600 477 79 948 4 914 906 120 816 33 697 
4.5 Target electrification levels 
The electrification scenarios used in this study are based on target service levels and the period 
over which the backlog is to be eliminated. Although the targets until 1999 are clear, there has 
been little analysis thus far of longer term electrification coverage levels. The base scenario 
used in this study is summarised in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Base electrification targets and coverage levels 
Year 10 Year20 
Urban Rura/1 Rura/2 Urban Rura/1 Rura/2 
(dense) (dispersed) (dense) (dispersed) 
None/inadequate 0% 0% 32% 0% 0% 0% 
Solar 1 0% 0% 16% 0% 0% 28% 
Solar 2 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 7% 
2.5 Amp grid 0% 14% 11% 0% 14% 20% 
8 Amp grid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
20Amp grid 56% 69% 33% 55% 69% 40% 
60 Amp, low income 19% 11% 3% 17% 12% 4% 
60 Amp, other 25% 5% 2% 27% 5% 2% 
The key aSpects of this scenario are that it is assumed that the existing backlog (that is, 
households with no electricity service at all in 1997) would be completely eliminated within 
five, ten and 20 years in the case of urban, rural1 (dense) and rural2 (dispersed) respectively. 
4.6 Capital subsidies 
The base scenario assumes that there will continue to be no capital subsidies for grid 
electrification, although a R1 500 grant is made available for every non-grid household 
connection. This is consistent with the Cabinet decision made during 1997. 
4. 7 Bulk purchase costs 
The base bulk purchase cost for electricity purchased by the REDs from the transmission 
system is estimated at 10 c/kWh. For those REDs whose consumer bases are located far from 
the main locus of generation, a small transmission surcharge is added, resulting in net purchase 
costs as follows: 
Northern (RED A) 
Western (RED B) 
Central (RED C) 
Eastern (RED D) 






This surcharge is nominal only and probably does not reflect the actual cost differentials in 
supplying electricity to areas which are far from the main locus of generating plants. Until a 
more cost-reflective tariff is available, however, the above numbers have been used. 
These costs all exclude Value Added Tax, as do all other financial values used in this report. 
4.8 Opening financial positions 
The financial position inherited by each RED will have an important impact on subsequent 
financial performance, particularly in relation to the value of liabilities taken over from Eskom 
and municipal distributors. Indeed, deciding on the appropriate level of debt is likely to be one 
of the more challenging issues in the restructuring process. 
For purposes of this modelling exercise, assumptions have been made about the value of assets 
and the level of gearing with which REDs will commence operations. In the case of their asset 
bases, these values have been estimated as the replacement costs of existing distribution 
infrastructure, with a level of gearing corresponding to a debt/equity ratio of 1:1. Admittedly, 
this is a somewhat arbitrary assumption - albeit reasonably favourable for the REDs - but it is 
necessary to make some estimate of their .opening financial positions. The resulting balance 
sheets for each of the five REDs are summarised in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Opening balance sheets for the five REDs 
Assets Liabilities Reserves 
Northern (A) 4 664 2 332 2 332 
Western (B) 942 471 471 
Central (C) 2 773 1 386 1 386 
Eastern (D) 2 271 1 135 1 135 
Wits(E) 1 820 910 910 
Total 12470 6234 6234 
Clearly, the opening liabilities faced by the REDs will have a strong influence on their net 
profitability particularly in the prevailing context of high real interest rates. Higher debt/equity 
ratios will place the REDs under considerably more pressure from the beginning, both in terms 
of their ability to raise additional capital at acceptable costs, and insofar as existing debt has to 
be serviced. 
4. 9 Key financing assumptions 
There are several critical assumptions related to the financing of the REDs' operations. The first 
of these relates to the transfer which has historically been made by local authorities from their 
electricity trading account to their general rates and other service accounts. Nationally, the size 
of this annual surplus was estimated at around Rl.S billion for 1994, 50% of which was earned 
by just four municipal distributors (ERIC 1996). 
In all the policy development to-date, the principle has been adopted that this source of 
municipal revenue should continue to be available to local authorities even under a RED-type 
structure - the most probable mechanism through which this will be achieved is by allowing 
local authorities the right to levy a tax on the RED's electricity sales in their jurisdiction. 
In the present modelling exercise, this assumption has also been adopted in the base case. 
Data on municipal electricity surpluses for 1994 have been taken from the ERIC report. The 
treatment of these amounts in the EFM model is as follows: first, these amounts accrue to the 
RED through its normal revenues; secondly, they are then paid out to local authorities based 
on a fixed percentage of revenues. In other words, the 'tax' would reduce the gross operating 
surpluses available to the REDs, without changing the price paid by end-users. Clearly, 
therefore, this is a critical assumption since it directly reduces the REDs' bottom-line by a total 
of R1.8 billion (1997 figures). These amounts are summarised for each RED in Table 7. 
Table 7: Financial transfers to municipal distributors, Rm 1994 
RED Gaut WCape KZN ECape Mpum NW FS N'them NCape Total 
Northern (A) 148 71 7 43 269 
Western (B) 212 0 212 
Central (C) 40 100 57 58 9 264 
Eastern (D) 161 1 3 165 
Wits (E) 588 1 2 591 
Total SA 777 212 161 100 73 64 63 43 9 1 502 
For purposes of the modelling, these values have been inflated to 1997 Rands, yielding a total 
transfer of R1 789 million for that year. 
A second important financing assumption relates to the size of the cross-subsidy burden 
imposed on electricity consumers for the purpose of financing the electrification programme. 
Most analyses to-date have worked with an effective cross-subsidy of about 5%, this being the 
real increase in tariffs for all consumers attributable to the cross-subsidisation of electrification 
consumers. 
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There is no absolute limit to the amount (a form of 'levy') which other consumers would be 
willing and able to bear, nor is there any literature suggesting what a reasonable burden might 
be. Aside from the simple price-related substitution effect (accounted for in the EFM model 
through elasticity assumptions), there could be significant political and economic costs if the 
levy becomes too large. For present purposes, a ceiling of 5%- as a one-off across the board 
real increase applicable to all consumers - has been assumed in the base case. This could 
obviously be increased or decreased for analytical purposes. 
A third financing assumption relates to the tariff levels used in the model. As noted below, 
Eskom's tariffs have been used as proxies for those of the REDs. In fact, this means that there is 
already an implicit source of finance already included, to the extent that Eskom's prices are 
higher than they would otherwise have been without the electrification programme. Although it 
is difficult to quantify this exactly, since the scale is changed so quickly, the implicit cross-
subsidy is of the order of a few percentage points. Moreover, for some municipal distributors, 
moving onto these tariffs would cause prices to rise, thus representing an additional source of 
financing ~vailable to the REDs. At this stage, insufficient data is available to estimate how 
significant this increased source of finance would be. 
A further assumption relates to the issue of inter-RED financial transfers. This is a policy issue 
which is yet to be resolved by government, but it is possible that any losses (or a portion 
thereof) made by some distributors could be covered by transfers from more profitable REDs. 
However, this option has not been incorporated into this financial analysis, primarily because 
this would significantly distort the incentives faced by REDs on both sides: there would be 
impaired incentives both for loss-makers to increase efficiency levels or tariffs, and for profitable 
REDs to continue seeking efficiency gains. Nonetheless, it is possible that government could 
introduce a mechanism for making such transfers. 
The last financing assumption of importance concerns the debt/equity ratio which is assumed 
to apply to REDs. As noted earlier, it has been assumed that each RED will take over a balance 
sheet with a debt/equity ratio of 1:1, reflecting a healthy balance sheet with modest debt levels. 
Regarding future gearing levels, although there are no absolute guidelines or rules of thumb 
dictating what gearing levels are sustainable, a fairly conservative assumption has been made 
for present purposes, namely that distributors would have a debt/equity ceiling of 1.5:1 , thus 
permitting an increase in gearing levels from their opening positions. Above this, their risk 
profiles would begin to deteriorate considerably and the cost of borrowing would rise rapidly, 
to the point where their credit worthiness would be limited; hence for present purposes the 
analysis has assumed a cap of 1.5: 1. 
4. 1 0 Treatment of inflation 
An inflationary environment introduces complexities into a modelling exercise such as this one, 
where a 20-year time frame is being analysed. Although it is possible to use nominal values in 
all cases (that is, actual Rand amounts as inflated), it is more meaningful to use real values (that 
is, to express all monetary amounts in the base year's currency). Methodologically, the model 
caters for an inflationary environment such as the South African one by converting all financial 
flows to real terms. In the case of finance charges, for example, this means that interest costs 
(and revenues) are calculated using the nominal interest rate, based on the nominal value of 
the liabilities (and cash reserves) for the relevant period, and the result is then discounted back 
to 1997 Rands. 
In the case of fixed assets, it is assumed that the REDs have an accounting policy of revaluing 
their assets annually to reflect their value in real terms. This is standard practice in an 
inflationary environment where current cost (that is, 'real' value) accounting statements are 
produced. Similar logic applies to depreciation charges against those assets.3 
In the EFM, this means that unlike other balance sheet items such as debt and equity, fixed assets and 
accumulated depreciation are not deflated from one year to the next. Instead, their real value is held 
constant, with the difference (that is, the amount by which they are being revalued - or not deflated) 
being credited to a revaluation reserve. 
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For modelling purposes, an inflation rate of 6% has been used, with interest rates of 16%, 14% 
and 10% respectively on short-term borrowings, long-term borrowings and positive cash 
deposits. These translate into real rates of 9.4%, 7.5% and 3.8% respectively. Although these 
rates have been used for the full 20-year period, the model has the facility to adjust the rates 
for intermediate five-year periods. 
4. 11 Other assumptions 
Other important assumptions include those around capital costs of new connections, operating 
costs, average electricity tariffs and asset replacement costs. All values used for these variables 
are shown in Appendix 1. In the case of capital costs, the estimated costs have distinguished 
between urban, rural 1 (dense) and rural 2 (dispersed) settlement types, each level of service 
(both grid and off-grid) and between different time periods. The effect of these categories is that 
grid connection costs are obviously expected to be much higher in more remote rural areas in a 
number of years' time. Capital cost estimates have been based on published reports in the case 
of off-grid ~osts (Banks et al 1996); for grid electrification, 2.5A and 20A costs are based on 
data supplied by Eskom's Electrification Planning department, while other levels of service are 
based on published reports from the NER (1996b) and Davis (1996). 
The same data sources have been used for support and operating cost estimates. It should be 
noted that the use of Eskom's cost values embodies a further assumption that there will be 
convergence between the operating and support costs of Eskom and municipal distributors. 
Although it is generally acknowledged that efficiencies in many distributors can improve, there 
are few data at present to indicate how significant these cost decreases will have to be. This 
remains something of an unknown factor, so the issue is merely highlighted here. 
Average tariffs have been based on the 1997 schedule of tariffs used by Eskom in the case of 
grid options for both residential and non-residential, whilst in the case of the solar options, the 
same tariff has been used for 'Solar 1' as for the 2.5A supply (R15 per month) , compared to a 
slightly higher level of R20 per month for the 'Solar 2' level of service. 
5. Results of the analysis 
In the following sections, the most important results of the modelling exercise are presented, 
firstly for the REDs with grid and off-grid electrification combined, and, secondly, for off-grid 
electrification alone. 
5. 1 Financial position of REDs with grid and off-grid 
combined 
5. 1. 1 Reasonableness of overall results 
It has been well established from previous analyses that the electrification programme, as an 
investment in its own right, is financially unattractive, producing a negative net present value of 
about R20 billion over 20 years (Davis 1996: 16). At the level of individual households, this 
equates to an average net present value of around negative R3 250, although this obviously 
varies considerably between households around the country, depending on capital connection 
costs, consumption levels, and types of service. 
The results in this analysis confirm the above observations, although it is worth pointing out 
that the range in net costs (negative NPV) of electrification connections is very wide for 
different levels of service at different times: for 2.5A consumers, for instance, these could be as 
low as negative R1 500 in urban areas but as high as negative R5 500 in the remote rural 
areas. Similar orders of magnitude apply to other service levels, with the exception of 60A 
middle- and high-income consumers who g_enerate positive net present values (in other words, 
they produce a positive return on investment). In principle, therefore, an electrification scenario 
which better matches levels of service with affordability will have a lower net cost. 
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The consolidated results of all five REDs appear to correlate closely with the estimated financial 
picture of the industry at present, as reported in other studies and published reports. The ERIC 
report estimated total revenue of R22.2 billion in 1995 which, if adjusted for sales volume 
growth of 3% per annum and inflation of 8% from 1996 to 1997, yields total revenues of 
R25.4 billion for 1997. The total revenue estimated by the present model for 1997 was R24.4 
billion (before any real price increases). Likewise, comparison of the operating income in the 
two modelling exercises yields broadly similar results: the ERIC report estimated an operating 
income of R3.6 billion (before interest and municipal transfers) which, if adjusted for growth 
and inflation, amounts to R4.0 billion. By comparison, this study calculated a slightly lower 
amount of R3 . 7 billion. 
A somewhat larger difference in the results concerns interest costs: ERIC estimated these at 
R1.1 billion, whereas this study put them at R0.7 billion in 1997. However, the ERIC study did 
not state all of its assumptions, so it is difficult to account for this difference; it is possible that 
the present study assumed a lower level of debt which REDs take over upon their creation. It 
has been assumed that they will have to be created with fairly strong balance sheets (that is, 
low debt levels) if they are to be able to borrow on capital markets- especially since they will 
no longer have the 'Eskom' name and underlying generation and transmission asset base as 
security. Also, the present exercise has modelled three sets of interest flows: short-term interest 
expense (at higher cost), long-term interest expense on capital borrowings, and interest earned 
on positive cash balances. The latter, in particular, has the effect of reducing the net finance 
charges. 
Overall, it would seem therefore that the financial results produced by the EFM model are 
broadly plausible in relation to those produced by the ERIC and other studies. 
5.1.2 Financial performance of REDs with no price increases 
As a starting point, the financial position of the five REDs has been modelled, without any real 
price increase or injections of external subsidy finance. 4 In this case, three of the REDs -
Western, Eastern and Wits - are financially sound, but the remaining two - Northern and 
Central - incur heavy losses. This is evident from Figure 4, which also shows that for both 
Northern and Central REDs their net loss after finance charges exceeds R1 billion in 2006. This 
is clearly completely unsustainable, and these REDs require some intervention if they are to be 
viable. The other three REDs are in comfortable financial positions, producing healthy net 
profits (even after making the transfer to local authorities in respect of their original surpluses). 
In these cases, no further interventions are required, in the form of price increases or external 
subsidies. 
For Northern and Central REDs, the first response would be to raise tariffs across the board, 
within the limits of what will be affordable to their consumers and avoid any significant 
substitution effects. Also, large regional differences in tariffs could prejudice the poorer regions 
since they would be unable to compete on the basis of price with the other REDs. 
Consequently, a cap on real price increases has been modelled. 
4 Other than the Rl 500 subsidy per off-grid connection. This, however, has a negligible impact on the 
overall positions discussed here. 
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Figure 4: Net income/loss for REDs with no price increases or subsidies 
5. 1.3 Financial performance of REDs with price increases and subsidies 
A real increase in electricity tariffs will clearly have a positive impact on the finances of the two 
REDs which are making losses, although this will also be partly offset by revenue lost due to 
reduced consumption.5 For present purposes, a cap on real price increases of 5% has been 
used. In the case of Northern RED, this is sufficient to return it to profitability, although for 
Central RED a small shortfall remains. This amounts to some R595 million over the years 2000 
to 2006 representing the amount which, in principle, would have to be transferred to the RED 
to keep it within the financial parameters previously described. Table 8 summarises key 
elements from the financial statements of the five REDs; full copies of the statements are 
contained in Appendix 3 of this report. 
5 In the absence of better information, a price elasticity of -0.20 has been used for all consumer classes. 
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Table 8: Financial results of the five REDs (grid and off-grid) in 1997, Am 
Northern (A) Western (B) Central (C) Eastern (D) Wits (E) Total 
Financing: 
Real price increase 5% nil 5% nil nil 
External subsidy nil nil nil nil nil 
Income statement: 
Sales revenue 6 829 2 271 4 681 4 911 6 291 24 983 
Operating costs (5 944) (1 750) (4 153) (4 028) (4 906) (20 781) 
Municipal transfers (320) (252) (314) (197) (704) (1 787) 
Operating surplus 565 269 214 686 681 2 415 
Interest paid (270) (35) (164) (98) (59) (632) 
Net surplus 294 234 51 588 622 1 783 
Balance sheet: 
Fixed assets 5 290 1 053 3 072 2 660 2 038 14 113 
Liabilities 2440 428 1 492 1 057 825 6 242 
Financial ratios: 
Debt/equity6 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.7 
Interest cover7 2.1 7.6 1.3 7.0 11.6 3.8 
Return on equity8 11% 34% 4% 34% 41% 21% 
Return on sales9 8% 11% 5% 14% 11% 10% 
It can be seen from the summarised results for 1997 that each RED is able to generate positive 
operating results, even after payment of the municipal transfer (based on an adjusted level of 
R1.8 billion in 1997), although obviously in the two weaker REDs, this would not have been 
possible without the 5% increase in price levels. Importantly, their debt levels appear are 
reasonable, with debt equity levels of 1.1 or less in each case. Interest cover is very strong for 
the three healthy REDs, reasonable for Northern RED, and marginal for Central RED at 1.3. 
The rates of return for the latter are also low, at 4% on equity, which suggests that problems 
could arise in later years. 
Thus it is evident from the above that the financial position of the five REDs is reasonably 
secure in 1997, subject to the provisos related to their financing interventions. In considering 
how this changes over time, it is worth considering another 'snap shot' of their financial 
position in five years (2002). In most cases, this is the point at which REDs' financial positions 
can be expected to be at their worst, since the bulk of the backlog will by then have been 
eliminated, with access levels of about 100% in urban areas and 70% in rural areas, whilst 
consumption (and therefore revenue) levels of newly electrified households are still low. Table 




The debt/equity ratio equals long term liabilities divided by accumulated reserves (accumulated surpluses, 
or equity) . 
The interest cover ratio equals net operating income (before interest) divided by interest paid. 
Return on equity equals net income (after interest) as a percentage of accumulated reserves. 
Return on sales equals net operating income (before interest) as a percentage of total sales revenue. 
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Table 9: Financial results of the five REDs (grid and off-grid) in 2002, Am 
Northern (A) Western (B) Central (C) Eastern (D) Wits (E) Total 
Financing: 
Real price increase10 5% nil 5% nil nil 
External subsidy 
-2002 nil nil 90 nil nil 90 
- 1997 to 2006 nil nil 595 nil nil 595 
Income statement: 
Sales revenue 8 627 2 861 5 633 6 243 7 811 31 175 
Operating costs (7746) (2 261) (5 093) (5 300) (6 163) (26 563) 
Municipal transfers (404) (318) (378) (249) (874) (2 223) 
Operating surplus 477 283 162 694 773 2 389 
Interest (paid)/earned (429) 58 (247) 76 233 (309) 
Net surplus 48 341 (85) 770 1 007 2 080 
Balance sheet: 
Fixed assets 7 874 1 492 4 205 4 295 2 832 20 698 
Liabilities 3 348 234 1 883 703 442 6 610 
Financial ratios: 
DebVequity 1.2 0.1 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 
Interest cover 1.1 na,, 0.7 na na 7.7 
Return on equity 2% 18% -7% 17% 20% 10% 
Return on sales 6% 10% 3% 11% 10% 8% 
Comparison of the REDs' financial positions in 1997 and 2002 as shown in Table 8 and Table 
9 respectively reveals that three of them (Western, Eastern and Wits) continue to enjoy 
favourable financial positions five years down the line, although in all cases their rates of return 
are lower than in 1997. Again, the remaining two REDs clearly show greater signs of financial 
stress, with Central RED continuing to make a financial loss in 2002. Examination of its 
financial statements (Appendix 3) shows that net losses of up to R89 million occur in the period 
up to 2006 when the capital expenditure programme slows down considerably. 
Based on the above analysis and assumptions, Central RED will require approximately R595 
million (1997 Rands) over the next ten years in order to maintain its balance sheet in a 
reasonably healthy state. This subsidy is paid over seven years and so if the amount is 
smoothed out, it represents an average of about R85 million per annum. This is a fairly modest 
amount, representing just 1.4% of the RED's annual revenue during those years. It would be 
possible, for instance, to avoid the need for an external subsidy by raising prices beyond the 
initial 5% cap: an additional 4.1% increase in 2000 would achieve an equivalent result. 
Whether this would be feasible or desirable is an important question, but one which is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
In the wider context, however, this subsidy requirement is very modest, representing just 0.3% 
of total industry revenue for the year 2002. Put differently, if electrification policy were that this 
had to be financed within the industry, it would require an additional 'levy' of 0.3% for the 
seven years to 2006. Although this percentage is small in relative terms, it is worth stating the 
obvious point that it would carry an opportunity cost insofar as electricity consumers would 
have to reduce their expenditure on other items as a result, with possibly a lower overall level 
of utility in society as a whole. 
In 2002, Central RED has a higher debt/equity levels - at the 'financial policy' limit in this 
study, of 1.5 - compared to 1.1 in 1997. It must be remembered that this is after taking 
account of the 5% real price increase in 1997, any price increases caused by adopting Eskom's 
10 One-off increase, in 1997. 
11 Interest cover ratio is not applicable since there is net interest earned. 
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tariffs, as well as the external subsidy inflows referred to above. As shown earlier, without these 
inflows Central (and Northern) REDs would not be financially viable. 
One result which is somewhat surprising is the relatively good financial position of the Eastern 
RED, which encompasses all of KwaZulu-Natal. It might have been expected that the RED 
which includes these areas would have financial problems because of the large number of 
unserved rural households in the province. Further analysis of these results suggests that one 
reason for these results could be around the high level of consumption applicable to domestic 
consumers (refer to Table 4). As noted earlier, these data were derived directly from the NER's 
statistical report ( 1996a), which showed a high level of consumption by Durban Electricity in 
the domestic consumer group. The figures are based on returns by distributors, in which a 
margin of error exists. Although no other data could be secured from the NER, it should be 
noted that these data - if incorrect - could possibly have the effect of distorting the results for 
the Eastern RED. 
Interestingly, the modelling shows that the gearing levels of the other three REDs (Western, 
Eastern and Wits) are lower in 2002 than in 1997, and they have moved into a net cash 
positive situation which yields net interest earnings. This is a result of their large consumer 
bases which are able to easily finance the electrification programme and its associated costs. 
As can be seen from the longer-term financial results of the REDs (Appendix 3), their finances 
remain viable over the remainder of the 20-year period. Thus, overall, the results of this study 
can partially confirm those of the ERIC report, since the three of the five REDs are clearly 
viable whilst the remaining two will be viable if their prices increase by 5% across the board 
and, in the case of Central RED, further finances are forthcoming in the form either of external 
subsidy finance or an additional 4% price increase in 2000. This conclusion is also subject to 
the provisos mentioned earlier, for example, around the convergence of tariffs and operating 
costs to those of Eskom. 
5.2 Financial position of off-grid electrification 
The above results have consolidated off-grid electrification with the grid programme, as if the 
RED is responsible for carrying out both. Given the relative scales of the grid and off-grid 
programmes, however, the latter tend to be overshadowed by the former. In this section, the 
results of the off-grid programme are reported separately as if this was the responsibility of 
separate off-grid agencies (operating within the same RED boundaries). 
Table 10 below summarises the financial results of off-grid electrification agencies in each of 
the five RED areas, for the year 2002. Results are not shown for 1997, as in the initial years of 
the programme, the amounts involved are generally small and so it is not very meaningful to 
analyse the results at that stage. 
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Table 10: Financial results for off-grid electrification in 2002, Rm 
Northern (A) Western (B) Central (C) Eastern (D) Wits (E) Total 
Connections: 
Cumulative yrs 1-5 79 219 2 585 52 286 76 564 624 211 278 
Financing: 
Capital grant (per R1 500 R1 500 R1 500 R1 500 R1 500 
connection) 
Income statement: 
Sales revenue 16 0 11 15 0 42 
Operating costs (36) (1) (24) (35) 0 (96) 
Operating loss (20) (1) (13) (20) 0 (54) 
Interest (paid)/earned (30) (1) (20) (29) 0 (80) 
Net loss (50) (2) (33) (49) 0 (134) 
Balance sheet: 
Fixed assets 216 7 142 208 2 575 
Accumulated losses (142) (5) (94) (140) (1) (382) 
Liabilities 132 4 87 128 352 
Financial ratios: 
Debt/equity negative negative negative negative negative negative 
Interest cover negative negative negative negative negative negative 
Return on equity negative negative negative negative negative negative 
Return on sales negative negative negative negative negative negative 
It is evident that a total of 211 000 off-grid connections are envisaged in terms of this scenario 
(all in remote rural areas), and with the current subsidy policy, whereby each of these new 
connections receives R1 500, the total burden on the fiscus from 1997 to 2002 for capital costs 
is R317 million. This is about 53% of the cumulative subsidy requirement for grid connections 
in Central RED, or 1.3% of the industry's consolidated revenue for 1997. 
It seems improbable that the government will wish to continually subsidise off-grid connections 
to this extent, especially when the grid-based industry's own revenue base is so large. Although 
it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse institutional and policy options for off-grid 
electrification, it would seem from the figures reported above that the solar programme would 
be best integrated with the grid programme, since on a stand-alone basis the programme is not 
financially sustainable. It is evident from the consolidated financial statements (in Appendix 3) 
that the effect of combining grid and off-grid makes little difference to the overall financial 
picture because of the small scale of the latter. 
Regarding operating results, it is clear that with the tariff options used in this scenario, off-grid 
electricity supply will result in financial losses to the supplier (even with the R1 500 capital 
subsidy). On its own, therefore, the solar electrification programme will not be financially 
viable, especially bec~use consumer demand for solar electricity is low to begin with, and it 
therefore has to compete with 2.5A and 20A grid connections, both on price and quality of 
service. Nonetheless, the fact that solar electrification will result in a loss does not mean it 
should be ruled out - rather, the point is that it will probably result in a smaller loss to the 
service provider than the alternative electricity supply option (2.5A or 20A) and from a 
financial point of view, would therefore be the preferable option in those cases. 
6. Analysis of alternative scenarios 
One of the requirements for this study is that it examines alternative criteria for applying 
'equity' objectives. In the base case scenario analysed earlier, the broad approach taken was 
one in which levels of service (solar 1, solar 2, 2.5A, etc.) were varied considerably in order to 
match level of service with income and affordability indicators- effectively, to achieve a more 
cost-effective supply mix in the face of low demand and high costs. The scenario was therefore 
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intended to more-or-less correspond with current trends in the industry. As far as equity criteria 
are concerned, the base scenario applied a mixed approach of grant finance: solar consumers 
all received the same capital grant from government (R1 500) whilst grid consumers received 
no capital grant from external sources (e.g. the fiscus), except in the Central RED where this 
was necessary to maintain its financial health; low-income grid consumers also benefited 
considerably from cross-subsidies. 
Two alternative interpretations of 'equity' may also be considered: 
• equity in outcome: in terms of which all consumers receive the same level of service, 
taken in this case to be a 20A grid supply; 
• equity in finance: in this case, all consumers benefit from the same amount of external 
grant finance, whether they are urban or rural, and regardless of their service level. 
Both of these scenarios have been modelled and their results are presented below. 
6. 1 F~nancial effects of aiming for 'equity in outcome' 
In this scenario, all input data remain the same as in the base scenario, with the exception that 
all households with incomes below R3 500 per month are provided with 20A connections (it is 
assumed that households who pay for higher levels of service - 60A - will not be prevented 
from receiving those). Time periods for elimination of backlogs in urban, rural 1 (dense) and 
rural2 (dispersed) areas remain as before, namely 5, 10 and 20 years respectively. The impact 
of such a scenario on the REDs is summarised in Table 11; full financial statements for the 20-
year period for each RED are contained in Appendix 4. 
Table 11: Financial results for REDs in 2002, equity in service levels, Am 
Northern (A) Western (B) Central (C) Eastern (D) Wits (E) 
Financing: 
Real price increase 5% nil 5% nil nil 
External subsidy 
-2002 361 nil 254 nil nil 
- 1997 to 2016 3 179 nil 6 537 nil nil 
Income statement: 
Sales revenue 8 555 2 846 5 596 6 208 7 781 
Operating costs (7 824) (2 262) (5 132) (5 357) (6162) 
Municipal transfers (402) (317) (377) (249) (872) 
Operating surplus 328 267 88 601 747 
Interest (paid)/earned (516) 51 (267) 7 225 
Net surplus/(loss) (187) 318 (179) 609 972 
Balance sheet: 
Fixed assets 8 395 1 503 4485 4 724 2 817 
Liabilities 4 018 230 2 141 596 441 
Financial ratios: 
Debt/equity 1.5 0.1 1.5 0.2 0.1 
Interest cover 0.6 na 0.3 na na 
Return on equity -7% 18% -13% 15% 20% 
















It is evident from these results that an electrification scenario in which all unelectrified 
households receive a 20A supply will require very substantial increases in subsidy finance. Both 
Northern and Central REDs still require the 5% general price increase, but their subsidy 
requirements have increased considerably as well: for Northern, this has increased from zero to 
R3 .2 billion (over years 4 to 14) , and for Central from R0.6 billion to R6.5 billion over the 
same period. The total subsidy requirement therefore increases by R9 .1 billion in the next 
years. This is highly significant, both in relation to the fiscus and to the electricity industry; this 
represents 31% of the total industry's turnover in 2002. Although a proper cost-benefit analysis 
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is beyond the scope of this study, it is highly improbable that such an increase in government 
spending could be justified on economic grounds through externalities, public health benefits 
and economic multipliers. 
If this was financed not from the fiscus but from the industry itself in the form of a 'levy' on all 
consumers over seven years to 2006 (when the worst of the backlog is eliminated), this levy 
would have to increase from 0.3% in the base case to 4.5% in this scenario- with considerable 
negative economic multipliers. Even if this was financed from the industry, there would still 
clearly be an opportunity cost, borne mainly by consumers - although it is beyond the scope of 
this project to quantify that impact. 
Comparison of Table 11 with Table 9 (the equivalent results in the base case) shows that the 
operating surpluses for all REDs decline with the higher service level, although, in the case of 
the three stronger REDs, these declines are all marginal. Provided Northern and Central REDs 
receive the external subsidies, they will remain financially viable over the 20-year period. For 
Northern RED, its retained income drops to a lowest point of just R285 million in 2007 after 
which it increases rapidly, reaching R3 557 million by 2016. Central RED shows a similar trend 
although its position is weaker throughout, reaching a low point of negative R352 million in 
2008, ending at R175 million in 2016. This suggests that the latter RED in particular will 
require tight management if it is to recover from the burden of electrification in the early years 
of the next decade, notwithstanding the large external subsidies it is assumed to receive. 
The reason for the differentiation between the two groups of REDs is mainly related to the 
larger backlogs of unelectrified households in the Northern and Central REDs, which would 
otherwise have been electrified with off-grid and 2.5A options in the base scenario. In the case 
of Western and Wits REDs especially, the number of additional 20A supplies compared to the 
base scenario is small. 
The level of service issue is a complex debate which extends beyond the financial realm into 
political, philosophical and social realms. Clearly, there are political and other benefits to 
investing public funds in higher levels of service for poorer households. However, the above 
results show clearly what the financial cost to the country would be were it to pursue the route 
of higher service levels across the entire population. The public policy questions which arise 
are, firstly, whether the benefits of spending more on electrification would outweigh the costs of 
doing so, and secondly, even if they do, whether or not there are other more productive uses 
to which those public funds should be put. 
6.2 Financial effects of applying 'equity in finance' 
In another alternative scenario, government may decide to provide an equivalent financial 
grant to all qualifying (that is, low income) households, along the same lines as the national 
housing subsidy and the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) subsidy for 
connector and bulk services. 
There is no guideline as to what the amount of the subsidy might be. Until now, government 
has been unwilling to provide any grant finance at all, since the industry has maintained that it 
is able to finance the electrification programme entirely from within. Indeed, given the above 
results, which show that with a mixed service level approach (the base scenario) the industry is 
viable in aggregate, it is unlikely to be willing to commit further resources to the electricity 
industry when it faces such stringent fiscal constraints as at present. 
Assuming that the absolute amount of subsidy finance made available by the fiscus to the 
REDs remains the same as in the base case (R595 million over the first ten years), then the 
individual allocation would be less than R500 per household. The effect on the REDs would be 
to reduce the subsidy flowing to Central RED and to re-allocate it to the other REDs 
proportionately. The net effect on the industry as a whole would be zero. 
6.3 Pricing of solar with grid-equivalent subsidies 
The financial flows in the base scenario for off-grid consumers are relatively simple, as 
summarised in Table 12. The table also shows the impact on both the NPV and average 
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monthly surplus/(loss) per connection, of having a higher up-front capital subsidy. The exact 
amount of the subsidy which is currently received by grid consumers from within the electricity 
industry is difficult to assess, but for present purposes the average from Davis (1996) can be 
used, namely R3 250 per connection. Not shown in the table are certain cash flows such as 
battery replacement costs (15% of equipment costs, every three years) and consumer 
connection fees (R10 each) . Also, the effect of declining real capital costs over time has not 
been included here. 
Table 12: Financial flows of off-grid consumers in two cases, 1997 
Capital cost Subsidy Tariff (Rim) NPV Equivalent 
monthly cost 
Solar 1: 
- base case 3 000 1 500 15 (2 531 ) (21 ) 
- equal subsidy 3 000 3 250 15 (911) (8) 
Solar 2: 
- base case 5 000 1 500 20 (3343) (28) 
- equal subsidy 5 000 3 250 20 (1 723) (1 5) 
It can be seen from the results in the table that the introduction of equivalent grant finance into 
the off-grid portion of the electrification programme would considerably reduce the negative 
NPV for both solar options, but does not move them sufficiently to reach a financially viable 
position. In the case of Solar 1, the net monthly cost decreases from R21 to R8, whilst for Solar 
2 this decreases from R28 to R15. This is mainly because of the need for the supplier to recover 
the costs of battery replacement every three years (not shown in the table) , and because 
support costs are relatively high at R16 per month. 
Put differently, in order for the supplier to break even in the above cases, the monthly tariffs 
would need to rise to the sum of: the tariffs used in the calculations in Table 12 (R15 for Solar 
1 and R20 for Solar 2) and the net monthly cost - a total of R36 per month in the base case for 
Solar 1 and R48 in the case of Solar 2. This underlines the high effective cost of solar options, 
especially in the rural context where income and affordability levels are low, and demand for 
off-grid is much lower than grid electricity. It also underlines the likelihood that off-grid 
electrification will not financially viable on its own, even if fairly large capital subsidies were to 
be made available. 
This does not, however, imply that solar options should be abandoned. As mentioned earlier, 
the loss per solar connection may well be lower than the loss per grid connection in remote 
rural areas, and it would therefore make financial sense to pursue the solar options in these 
areas. 
7. Conclusions 
The objective of this study was to analyse the subsidy implications of electrification scenarios, 
based on the provisional boundaries of REDs as proposed in the government's most recent 
document (ERIC 1996). The first broad conclusion emerging is that only three of the five REDs 
appear to be financially viable based on their starting position, using the range of assumptions 
and scenarios elaborated in this report. The two REDs with financial difficulties are Northern 
and Central- they will require real price increases of 5% across the board and, in the case of 
Central, additional external subsidy transfers of R595 million over the seven years to 2006. In 
arriving at these results, it is worth summarising the most important financial parameters 
impacting on the modelling exercise: 
• Tariffs in each RED are based on Eskom's 1997 tariffs and this means that the large number 
of existing tariffs will converge to these· levels. In the absence of data to this effect, it is 
difficult to assess whether there will be a net increase or decrease in tariffs for those 
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consumers currently supplied by municipalities, although it is possible that tariffs would rise 
for residential consumers and decline for non-residential consumers. 
• Likewise, operating costs are assumed to converge towards those used by Eskom in its 
financial planning, thus implying an increase in operating efficiency on the part of municipal 
distributors. 
• The new REDs are expected to commence operations with relatively strong balance sheets, 
with debt/equity ratios of 1:1. This is a fairly favourable opening position which is 
considered necessary in order for REDs to be able to raise the necessary capital finance at 
competitive rates. The implication is that Eskom's generation and transmission divisions 
may have to accept somewhat higher debt loadings. 
• The REDs are expected to make transfer payments to municipal service authorities in their 
jurisdiction, equivalent to the percentage surpluses currently earned from the trade of 
electricity. According to the ERIC report, these amounted to Rl.5 billion per annum and so 
the surplus retained within the REDs will be reduced by the equivalent percentage each 
year. 
• Fairly conservative financial constraints have been imposed on REDs in terms of price 
increases and debt levels. For instance, a maximum real price increase of 5% has been 
selected and a maximum debt/equity ratio of 1.5, on the basis that any higher price 
increases or gearing levels could lead to financial problems of their own. 
• The analysis has not accounted for the possible introduction of income taxation or dividend 
payments in the electricity industry. In both cases, the effective price of electricity will 
increase (all other things equal) , probably also resulting in some loss of revenues as 
consumption decreases as a result. 
The results of the analysis raise difficult policy questions, as they indicate that the most recent 
proposal of five REDs is only marginally sustainable in two REDs but easily manageable for the 
other three. Different financial conditions (for example, higher interest rates or heavier initial 
debt loadings) could push the Northern and Central REDs into unsustainable territory. The 
situation is therefore rather tenuous; and several options exist to address it: 
• Firstly, government could provide the capital grants required to sustain the viability of 
Central RED. To-date, however, government has not provided any grant finance specifically 
for electrification (other than through its municipal grant programmes) and it is unlikely to 
begin doing so, particularly while other REDs are making healthy surpluses. On the other 
hand, this position could change with the introduction of corporate income tax and divided 
payments in the electricity industry in the near future, as government may agree to provide 
some grant finance in lieu of the additional tax burden. 
• Secondly, a mechanism could be established through which transfers are made from 
healthy to unviable REDs, based on as yet unspecified criteria. However, this could 
seriously distort the financial incentives faced by both categories of distributor, effectively 
discouraging the three wealthier REDs from making surpluses, whilst reducing the incentive 
for the two poorer REDs to cut their losses. 
• Thirdly, a levy could be introduced on sales to ali electricity consumers; the proceeds would 
then be paid into a central fund and redistributed to REDs according to a set of criteria 
which will ensure their financial viability. This option has been considered for several years, 
but is not favoured by the Department of Finance as it remains outside of central fiscal 
control. Needless to say, this option, like the previous two options, carries an opportunity 
cost insofar as both the higher electricity tariffs paid by consumers and the use of limited 
government grant finance preclude the use of those resources for other, potentially more 
productive purposes. 
• Finally, the boundaries of the REDs coul9 be re-drawn in such a way that each distributor is 
financially viable on its own. Although this will require more desk-based analysis to model 
the financial viability of the REDs before they can be set up, it is likely that the long-term 
cost effectiveness of such a system will be considerably greater than in any of the above 
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three options.12 The regulatory and governance responsibilities attached to any option 
where financial transfers are made on an annual basis, in terms of complex and potentially 
politically-loaded criteria, will be significant and costly. 
This issue of RED boundaries and the financial parameters within which they operate is one of 
the most important policy questions to be settled in the restructuring process. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this project to propose revised RED boundaries, further analysis might 
reveal that, say, three or four REDs could be financially viable: for instance, by combining 
Northern and Wits, and by incorporating some or all of Central RED (particularly the former 
Transkei area) in more profitable neighbouring REDs such as Eastern RED. This issue is one 
which merits further analysis. 
The analysis of off-grid electrification suggests that, as a stand-alone operation, it is not 
financially viable- that is, at the tariff levels used in this study, which were set at a similar level 
to 2.5A supplies. It is clear that on a purely financial level, subsidies will be required to sustain 
an off-grid electrification programme. Although large in relation to the off-grid programme 
itself, these-subsidy requirements are very modest in relation to the grid programme. This is not 
to say off-grid electrification is financially unattractive- on the contrary, in many rural areas, it 
will result in smaller losses being incurred by the REDs and therefore carries a lower 
opportunity cost than grid electrification. 
Also important are the conclusions emerging from the analysis of an alternative electrification 
scenario in which 'equity in outcome' is taken as the objective. In this scenario, all unelectrified 
households were assumed to receive 20A supplies, and this had a large negative effect on the 
performance of the two weaker distributors - Northern and Central. Their total subsidy 
requirement in this scenario increased by a cumulative R9 .1 billion over the 20 years of the 
programme - funds which could almost certainly be put to better use elsewhere in the 
economy. Thus the current direction being taken by the industry, namely that of providing 
consumers with choices of various service levels, which have costs and tariffs better matched to 
their affordability profiles, makes good financial sense. Obviously, political and social issues 
have to be traded off with financial ones in deciding on the right mix of service levels. 
Finally, the question arises of whether subsidies can be effectively targeted at the poor. This is 
less a question of raising subsidy funds than one of allocating them. Various options exist for 
allocating subsidy funds, for example: 
• direct transfer payments to the poor, such as through a stamp/voucher system based on 
means testing; or as a proxy, through pensions which are usually the main source of 
income for the poorest rural people; 
• cross-subsidies through the electricity tariff, which occur in the case of single energy rate 
tariffs at low levels of consumption, and flat monthly charges at higher levels of 
consumption - at present, most new electrification customers fall into one of these 
categories; 
• capital grants to new electricity consumers, financed either from the fiscus or from within 
the electricity industry - the latter applies to the funds allocated by Eskom to the NER for 
onward granting to municipal distributors. 
Each of the above mechanisms has its advantages and disadvantages, both in theory and in 
practice. One of the most important considerations arising in the South African context is their 
relative 'transaction costs' : given an overburdened and underdeveloped administrative capacity 
at many levels in the public sector, it is suggested that the use of tariffs can be a cost-effective 
means of targeting the poor. The usual argument advanced against this option is that it can 
seriously distort prices, with negative knock-on effects throughout the economy. As this analysis 
has shown, provided the finances of the industry are tightly managed and the financial viability 
of utilities is kept intact, the extent of these cross-subsidies is generally modest and, on the 
whole, sustainable. Particularly in an environment where each RED faces clear objectives with 
12 The model used here, the EFM, has been designed to easily accommodate different RED boundaries. 
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the potential to manage its finances sustainably, it will be possible to achieve a balance 
between financial viability and redistributive electrification. 
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Appendix 1 
MODEL INPUTS 
Appendix 1 - 1 
In the pages which follow, the input sheets in the Excel spreadsheet model are shown using 
Northern RED (A) as the example. These sheets include default variables wherever these have 
been entered. 
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Appendix 2 
MODEL OUTPUTS 
Appendix 2 - 1 
In the pages which follow, the output sheets in the Excel spreadsheet model are shown. 
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Appendix 3 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR REDS 
Appendix 3 - 1 
In the pages which follow, complete financial statements- consisting of an Income Statement, 
Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement - are presented for each of the five REDs. Results are 
shown for the grid and off-grid sectors combined and separately. 
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Appendix4 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR REDS- ALTERNATIVE 
SCENARIO WITH 'EQUITY IN OUTCOME' 
In the pages which follow, complete financial statements are presented for the five REDs, based 
on the alternative scenario in which all unelectrified households receive 20A supplies. 
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